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1. Introduction 
In this paper we empirically examine the change in the riskiness of acquisitions made 
by US public firms before and after the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX) Act and its 
relation to executives’ incentive compensation. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act was enacted by the 
U.S. Congress in 30 July 2002 following the crash of the internet bubble and a number of 
serious corporate scandals such as those of Enron and Wordcom. Among the aims of the 
regulators were to enhance the quality of financial disclosures, to improve the effectiveness 
of directors’ monitoring and to re-establish the confidence of investors.  
The legal liabilities of executive directors have increased substantially after 2002 as 
SOX requires the accuracy of information included in the financial statements to be certified 
by the top directors (CEO and CFO) of the firm (Section 302). Should this provision be 
wilfully or knowingly violated, criminal liabilities can be imposed against these top 
managers. These higher penalties mandated by SOX for misreporting of financial information 
have increased the potential personal costs of directors, making high-risk projects less 
attractive to them in the period after 2002. Moreover, companies are required to provide 
sufficient evidence regarding the adequacy of their internal controls (Section 404). Risky, 
difficult to monitor projects raise the cost of compliance with Section 404, which is expected 
to lead to a decrease in directors’ incentives to engage in risky investments.  
As a results of the increased liabilities and the subsequent personal and litigation costs 
imposed to executives by the governance regulations, the way directors are motivated by 
compensation is expected to substantially chang post-SOX. Given that corporate acquisitions 
are already amongst the riskiest type of investment decisions managers can make, they are 
associated with an increased probability of the afore-mentioned costs. Consequently, in the 
post-SOX period, we expect that managerial incentives to engage in risk acquisition decisions 
are diminished. 
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We contribute to the literature by offering a new perspective regarding the perception 
of risk from a managerial perspective during the post-SOX period. Cohen et al. (2013) 
hypothesize that, all else equal, CEOs are expected to respond less to a unit of incentive 
compensation post-SOX in relation to the pre-SOX period. We complement and add to this 
evidence by identifying for first time a significant change in the direction of the relation 
between equity-related compensation and risk-taking activity in M&A decisions following 
the enactment of SOX. Yermack (2006) states that it is necessary to look beyond routine 
activity and examine one-time events in order to better understand top management 
incentives from executive compensation. 
As the importance of managerial incentives is reflected in the significance of 
managerial decisions, we examine our hypotheses in the setting of mergers and acquisitions 
(M&As) as one of the most important corporate investment decisions and with an often large 
value impact. In addition, the uncertainty associated with acquisition decisions can increase 
the intensity of agency conflicts between managers and shareholders and so offers an ideal 
environment to investigate the effectiveness of executive compensation (Zhao, 2013).  
Harford and Li (2007) show that the post-acquisition stock performance can affect the 
sensitivity of CEO’s wealth to stock price movements. In contrast, such a relation between 
stock price performance and CEO’s wealth is not evident in the case of large capital 
expenditures which are indicative of the importance of M&As in the examination of 
managerial incentives. 
We find a positive relation between managerial incentive compensation and post-
acquisition changes in risk before 2002.  This supports earlier work that executive stock 
options incentive managers in M&A decisions (Datta et al., 2001) and that options increase 
the convexity of managerial payoffs (Coles et al., 2006). However, we find a significant 
change in the association between incentive compensation and risk-taking activity post-SOX. 
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Managers whose compensation is more closely linked to stock price performance make less 
risky M&A decisions after the passage of SOX relative to their counterparts whose 
compensation is less closely tied to stock price performance.  
The results remain robust for different specifications of risk and incentives. We 
measure managerial incentives using new stock and option grants, unexercised (vested and 
unvested) stock options, unexercised restricted stock, the sensitivity of managers’ wealth to 
stock price performance and the sensitivity of managers’ wealth to stock price volatility. We 
further control for a series of confounding events that could affect acquirer’s risk and we 
address any potential concerns surrounding causality in the relation between executive 
compensation and firm risk.  
Our findings show that although firms have changed the structure of their directors’ 
compensation in such a way as to induce them to take less risk post-SOX (Cohen et al., 
2013), directors have also changed the way they view risk-taking incentives provided by 
equity-related compensation.  
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 summarises the literature and 
develop the hypotheses. Section 3 presents the data sample and outlines the research design. 
Section 4 provides summary and descriptive statistics. Section 5 presents the empirical 
results. Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. Literature review and hypotheses development 
2.1. Incentive compensation and risk-seeking incentives 
Incentive compensation has extensively been considered as an effective mechanism of 
mitigating agency costs. The period 1992-2002 showed a significant growth in managerial 
equity-based compensation especially in the form of executive stock options (Coles et al., 
2006). If managers are not given the necessary incentives via their compensation structure, 
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they may forgo positive net-present-value projects that increase firm risk (Smith and Stulz, 
1985). This problem can be more severe when the firm has valuable investment opportunities 
(Guay, 1999).  In such a case, manager’s wealth is expected to be more closely tied to firm 
performance (Smith and Watts, 1992). 
Equity-related compensation appears to provide risk-increasing incentives for the vast 
majority of managers’ investment decisions. In the area of M&As, Datta et al., (2001) find 
that managers with higher equity-based compensation make M&A decisions that increase the 
risk of their firm’s stock by a greater amount relative to managers with weaker equity 
incentives. Agrawal and Mandelker (1987) also find a positive relation between managerial 
holdings of common stock and stock options and acquisition risk. Regarding other investment 
decisions, Rogers (2002) finds a strong negative relation between derivative holdings, which 
are used for hedging purposes and managerial risk-taking incentives provided by stock and 
options.  Anantharaman and Lee (2014) show that the sensitivity of top management’s wealth 
to stock price volatility is positively related to risky managerial behaviour in pension plans. 
Hirshleifer and Suh (1992) provide evidence of a positive link between option-based 
compensation and R&D expenditures.  
Nevertheless, not all forms of equity-related compensation are equally effective in 
inducing investment in risky projects. The effectiveness of stock options in increasing risk-
taking activity is much greater than that of common stock given the convex nature of option 
payoffs (Guay, 1999). Along the same line, Smith and Watts (1982) note that restricted stock 
plans cannot control the manager’s risk aversion effectively. Nam et al. (2003) find that 
higher Vega leads to higher levels of investment in R&D and higher debt ratios. Opposite but 
less statistically significant relations were found for Delta. Ross (2004) notes that no 
compensation plan will necessarily make all agents less risk averse. The outcome will depend 
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on the executive’s utility function and the movement can be into either more or less risk-
averse portions. 
 
2.2.  SOX and risk-seeking incentives from executive compensation  
After the passage of SOX, a significant reduction in risk-taking activity by public US 
companies has been documented (Bargeron et al., 2010), while their innovative potential has 
also been negatively affected (Shabad, 2008). These studies suggest that the increased 
liability on executive directors imposed by the passage of the governance regulation has had 
an adverse impact on managers’ incentives to engage in risky projects.  
However, firms may also change the structure of managerial incentive compensation 
based on the desired level of risk in the new regulatory environment. Cohen et al. (2013) find 
that the decline in risky investments after the passage of SOX can be attributed both to 
changes in executive compensation and to increased personal costs of directors. Carter et al. 
(2009) show that post-SOX firms place more weight on earnings in bonus contracts and 
Dicks (2012) suggests that the use of incentive compensation, as a substitute for governance 
in reducing agency costs, declines post-SOX.1  
 Taking everything together, it appears that SOX reduces the incentives for top 
management to engage in risky investment projects.  We expect that this mitigates the role of 
incentive compensation previously documented by Datta et al., (2001). Examining the change 
in riskiness of acquisitions between the pre-SOX and post-SOX period in the US, we expect 
to find a decline in acquisition risk overall. However, we expect that the reduction in risk will 
be more intense for those acquirers who pay managers more in the form of equity based 
                                                          
1 Brown and Lee (2007) and Heron et al. (2007) argue that the decline in the use of stock-options is related to 
the passage of the revised Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 123 (SFAS No. 123R), which 
increases the cost of providing stock options by the firm. However, Cohen et al. (2013) show that the 
documented changes in the structure of incentive compensation cannot be attributed to SFAS No. 123R alone. 
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compensation. Thus, we propose that SOX mitigates the positive relation between incentive 
compensation and changes in firm risk post-M&A. 
 
3. Data and research design 
3.1. Sample selection criteria 
We use the SDC Platinum database to identify all completed US mergers and 
acquisitions with an announcement and effective date between January 1, 1993 and 
December 31, 2010. Following Aktas et al. (2013), only those transactions that have been 
classified as mergers, acquisitions, acquisitions of majority interest, acquisitions of assets, 
acquisitions of certain assets, acquisitions of remaining interest, and exchange offers are 
included in our sample. Moreover, the transaction must have a disclosed deal value of at least 
$1 million2; both the bidder and target should be US firms; the acquirer should be a publicly 
listed company owning less than 50 percent of the target’s shares six months prior to the 
acquisition announcement and must acquire at least 50 percent of the shares in the transaction 
in order that an explicit change of control can be ensured. These criteria result in a sample 
size of 28,751 transactions. 
 We match these transactions to the Standards and Poor’s ExecuComp database for 
executive compensation data. ExecuComp provides compensation data on the top five highest 
compensated officers for firms in the S&P 1500 Index. We require the acquiring firm to have 
executive compensation data available for the year preceding the acquisition announcement. 
Since ExecuComp does not have data before 1992, the start date of our sample is dictated in 
1993. After merging with Execucomp, the number of observations is reduced to 8,179. We 
also require that the bidder must have accounting data available in Compustat at the time of 
acquisition announcement and stock price data in CRSP for one calendar year surrounding 
                                                          
2 All dollar values in the analysis are adjusted for consumer price inflation and expressed in 2010 USD. 
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the acquisition effective date such that our risk measures can be calculated. The produces a 
final sample of 7,747 acquisitions made by 1,908 firms. 
 
3.2. Incentive compensation variables 
As managers’ incentives may stem from both newly and previously awarded stock 
and option grants (Guay, 1999) we consider the incentive effects of all stock-based awards 
when examining the effectiveness of incentive compensation in risk-taking activity. We use a 
variety of incentive compensation measures to assure that our analysis captures all different 
types of incentives that managers can be provided with. We define New_Grants as the fair 
value3 of new option and restricted stock grants aggregated across the acquirer’s top five 
highest paid executives as a percentage of their total compensation for the financial year. 
Based on the findings of previous studies according to which stock options can induce risk-
taking activity more effectively than restricted stock (Smith and Watts, 1982; Guay, 1999) we 
further split this incentive measure to its components. New_OptionG measures the fair value 
of new executive stock options awarded to the top five directors as a percentage of their total 
compensation and New_StockG measures the fair value of restricted stock granted to the top 
five executives as a percentage of their total compensation. Both measures are calculated for 
the year preceding the acquisition announcement. 
We also investigate the role of accumulated incentives in managers’ willingness to 
take risk. Accum_Incentives are calculated as the sum of unexercised (vested and unvested) 
stock options and unvested restricted stock held by the top five executives as a percentage of 
the total number of shares outstanding. As with New_Grants, we decompose 
Accum_Incentives into the incentives stemming from option and stock grants respectively. 
Unex_Options is the number of unexercised (vested and unvested) stock options to the total 
                                                          
3 Using the Black-Scholes valuation model. 
8 
 
number of shares outstanding and Unvest_Stock is the number of restricted stock grants that 
have not been vested yet to total shares outstanding. This approach allows us to observe 
which component(s) of incentive compensation drive managerial risk-taking activity.  
Furthermore, we test our results against the sensitivity of executives’ wealth to stock 
price performance and volatility. The dollar change in top-5 executives’ wealth for 1 percent 
change in the firm’s stock price is measured by Delta and the dollar change in top-5 
executives’ wealth for 1 percent change in the standard deviation of the firm’s stock returns is 
measured by Vega based on the data provided by Coles et al. (2006).4 The calculation of 
Delta and Vega follows the approach of Guay (1999) and Core and Guay; (2002). Vega 
should be positively related to stock return volatility, and the incentive to invest in risk 
increasing projects (Coles et al., 2006). In contrast, the relation of Delta to risk-taking activity 
is expected to be less important or even negative (Nam et al., 2003).  All compensation 
variables of accumulated incentives refer to the holdings of the top five executives. 
 
3.3. Acquisition risk measures 
We use two measures of the change in bidder’s risk around acquisition decisions. The 
first measure, D_St.Dev.Ef/ve_Date, captures the change in stock return volatility around the 
acquisition completion date and is calculated as the difference between the standard deviation 
of acquirer’s stock returns six months following the effective date (+1 to +126 days) minus 
the standard deviation of acquirer’s stock returns six months preceding the effective date (-
126 to -1 days). A positive value indicates an increase in firm risk after the acquisition while 
a negative value means that the volatility of stock returns has been decreased following the 
acquisition. Using the logarithm of the variance of daily stock returns instead of their 
                                                          
4 We are grateful to Core and Guay (2002) and Coles et al., (2006) for making available data on Delta and Vega. 
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standard deviation as a proxy for risk we find identical results.5 Likewise, repeating the 
analysis using an extended estimation period of two years surrounding the acquisition 
effective date based on the standard deviation of monthly stock returns gives very similar 
findings. These robustness tests provide supportive evidence of the validity of our risk 
measure as a proxy for the change in acquisition risk. 
Following Kravet (2014) and Agrawal and Mandelker (1987) we also construct a 
second risk variable, D_St.Dev.Ab/mal_Ret, which measures the change in standard deviation 
of acquirer’s abnormal returns around the acquisition decision. The estimation period is 
identical to that used in Agrawal and Mandelker (1987) and Datta et al., (2001) and it ranges 
from 120 to 61 days before the acquisition announcement and from 11 to 70 days after the 
acquisition effective date. We calculate abnormal stock returns as the residual from the 
market model using the CRSP value-weighted index. The implementation of two risk 
measures based on different estimation periods assures that any observed change in 
acquisition risk is not due to risk variable misspecification.6 
 
3.4. Confounding events 
The years preceding and following the passage of Sarbanes-Oxley Act are 
characterised by a number of sub-periods with confounding events that can have a significant 
impact on the risk-taking activity of a firm. Among the most important of these events are the 
collapse in the value of technology stocks in 2001, the passage of SFAS No. 123R, and the 
recent global financial crisis.7 A proper control of these confounding events is required in 
order to be able to safely attribute our results to the passage of SOX. 
                                                          
5 This methodology is followed by Coles et al., (2006). 
6 We use varying event windows for consistency with the original study, but our results here are robust to use 
identical estimations windows for measuring changes in firm risk surrounding the acquisition dates. 
7 We do not control for the terrorist attack of September 2001 as Bargeron et al. (2010) show that the decrease in 
risk-taking activity in the post-SOX period cannot be explained by any uncertainty about the US economy 
caused by this event. 
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We follow Cohen et al. (2013) to control for the tech stock collapse and the passage of 
SFAS No. 123R. A subsample of the acquiring firms is formed with an acquisition 
announcement date within the years 2000 and 2001. Cohen et al. (2013) shows that the 
strongest impact of the internet crash is documented between August 2000 and August 2001. 
For the latter period, we calculate cumulative stock returns for our bidders’ subsample and 
we allocate the acquiring firms to deciles based on their stock price performance for this 
period. The highest decile corresponds to the most positive returns while decile 10 
corresponds to the bidders most severely affected by the internet crisis. We adopt a similar 
approach to control for the period of financial crisis. We create subsamples of the acquirers 
with an acquisition announcement date in 2007, 2008 and 2009. Then, for each year acquirers 
are allocated to deciles according to their cumulative abnormal returns for that year. Unlike 
other studies, we do not use a dummy variable to control for the period of financial crisis in 
order to avoid any overlap with change in risk captured by our SOX variable.8 
SFAS No. 123R was introduced by the Financial Accounting Standard Boards in 2006 
and, among other issues, requires that costs associated with equity-based compensation 
should be expensed on the firm’s financial statements. One of the consequences of this 
regulation was the decrease in option-based compensation by public firms (Brown and Lee, 
2007). Since equity based compensation in the form of stock option grants is associated with 
higher managerial incentives for risk-increasing activity, we expect a decrease in acquisition 
risk after the passage of SFAS No. 123R. The original effective date of SFAS No. 123R was 
scheduled to be the first fiscal quarter after the 15th of June 2005. However, this was later 
modified by the SEC to the first fiscal quarter of the first fiscal year after the 15th of June 
2005.  Thus, we introduce a dummy variable, SFAS_123R, which takes the value of one if the 
acquisition announcement is made in 2006 and zero otherwise. 
                                                          
8 SOX is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the acquisition announcement date is after the enactment 
of Sarbanes-Oxley Act (30/07/2002) and zero otherwise. 
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4. Descriptive statistics 
Table 1 presents the distribution of our sample along with our main risk and 
compensation variables. While the data show no obvious clustering of observations, an 
increased M&A activity is observed in the late 90s prior to the collapse in valuations for tech 
stocks; a pattern consistent with previous research findings (Moeller et al, 2004; Masulis et 
al, 2007). Investment activity has been negatively affected by the market downturn that 
followed the internet crash in 2001 and the financial crisis in 2007 which is evident from the 
drop in acquisitions in subsequent years. This is supportive of our decision to control for 
these events in our analysis.  
Managers also appear less risk averse in the period preceding the crash of the internet 
bubble and the passage of SOX. Under both our risk measures, the volatility of bidders’ stock 
returns increase after the completion of acquisitions for the period 1995-2000. In contrast, 
completed acquisitions after the passage of SOX seem to lead to less volatility of stock 
returns with the exception of the first two years of financial crisis. However, the latter is more 
likely a result of the increased uncertainty caused by the global credit crunch rather than due 
to increased risk-taking activity on behalf of managers.  
The change in the structure of incentive compensation over time is consistent with the 
documented decrease in the importance of stock options after the passage of the Act (Dicks, 
2012). A considerable substitution of restricted stock for stock options is observed during the 
post-SOX. In 2001, before the passage of SOX, almost half of the average value (48.8 
percent) of the top management team’s compensation consists of option grants while the 
average value of restricted stock is only 4.9 percent of their total compensation. However, in 
2010, the last year in our sample, the average value of bidders’ top five executives’ total 
compensation consists 20.4 percent of stock options and 26.2 percent of restricted stock 
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grants. This change in compensation structure is consistent with firms’ incentives to avoid 
excessive risk post-SOX. As Flor et al., (2014) note, when managers can affect firm’s 
variance, an increase in the number of stocks of a contract that consists of both stocks and 
options is necessary in order to avoid excessive risk-taking.  The distribution of the 
sensitivity of executives’ wealth to stock price performance (Delta), is affected by the volume 
of acquisition activity. It reaches its peak at the late 1990s, just before the dotcom crash, and 
it falls in the period of the recent financial crisis. 
Table 2 presents summary statistics for all variables used in the analysis. Risk 
measures and incentive compensation variables are calculated as described in the previous 
section. Our control variables are consistent with those employed in prior studies in the areas 
of executive compensation and firm risk. The median value of both new stock grants and 
unvested stock is zero, as the majority of acquirers do not pay restricted stock to their 
executives until after the passage of Sarbanes-Oxley Act. Our mean and median values of 
Delta and Vega are higher than those of previous studies (Coles at al., 2006; Cohen et al., 
2013) as we examine the sensitivity of all top five executives’ wealth to stock price 
performance and volatility, and not only that of the CEO.9 Cash_Comp is the sum of Salary 
and Bonus as a percentage of the total compensation of bidder’s top five executives. 
Cash_Comp is used as a proxy for executives’ risk aversion since managers with high 
proportions of cash compensation and longer tenures are more likely to be entrenched and to 
avoid risk (Berger et al., 1997). We also control for CEO tenure as CEOs with more years in 
the office are likely to be characterised by risk-aversion in their decisions. Tenure measures 
the number of months the CEO has served in this position at the time of the acquisition 
announcement.  
                                                          
9 Coles et al., (2006) also provide compensation characteristics for the management team but they exclude the 
CEO so the reported dollar values of Delta and Vega are significantly lower than ours. Moreover, as already 
noted, our dollar values are expressed in 2010 USD. 
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Regarding acquirer’s characteristics, the logarithm of sales [log(Sales)] is used as a 
proxy for firm size. Based on the properties of managers’ utility functions10 (Core and Guay, 
1999; Cohen et al., 2013) and given that managers of larger firms receive higher 
compensation (Smith and Watts, 1992) we expect a positive relation between firm size and 
incentive compensation. Bargeron et al. (2010) finds that the decrease in standard deviation 
of stock returns post-SOX is greater for small firms compared to large ones. Sales_Growth is 
the logarithm of the ratio of the bidder’s sales in the acquisition announcement year to the 
sales in the year preceding the announcement. Since risk-taking incentives are positively 
related to firm’s investment opportunities (Guay, 1999) we expect a positive relation between 
sales growth and firm risk.  We further control for growth opportunities using the market-to-
book ratio (M/B) calculated at the month-end prior to the acquisition announcement date as 
book value of total assets minus book value of equity plus market value of equity divided by 
book value of total assets. Cash is the cash and cash equivalent available to the acquirer 
divided by total assets. Yermack (1995) notes that liquidity-constrained firms are more likely 
to use stock options instead of cash in their executive compensation structure. A similar 
hypothesis is made by Dechow et al. (1996). ROA is the bidder’s operating income before 
depreciation divided by total assets. Should incentive-based compensation align the interests 
of managers with those of shareholders mitigating agency costs, we expect better performing 
firms to award higher levels of incentive compensation to their managers. 
Firm risk can also be driven by executives’ capital structure and investment decisions. 
D_Leverage measures the change in the ratio of total debt to total assets from the year end 
preceding the acquisition announcement to the acquisition announcement year end.11 
Leverage is included in the analysis in order to ensure that any observed change in firm risk 
is not due to changes in the firm’s capital structure. While entrenched, risk-averse managers 
                                                          
10 The underlying assumption is that manager’s utility functions show a declining absolute risk aversion. 
11 We use the book value of leverage in order to avoid any changes in the market value of leverage that could be 
due to random changes in stock price and not due to intentional managerial actions (Welch, 2004). 
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try to avoid debt (Berger et al., 1997), we expect that managers of highly leveraged firm to be 
given less incentives for risk-increasing activity (John and John, 1993). R&D is the bidder’s 
research and development expenditures to total assets.12 We expect a positive relation 
between investment in R&D and firm risk. The R&D expense can also capture the investment 
opportunity set of a firm (Dechow et al., 1996). Bargeron et a. (2010) find that more 
specialized firms with higher investment in R&D before SOX reduced their risk-taking 
activity after the passage of the Act significantly more than firms with low R&D expenditures 
in the same period. Net_PPE is the acquirer’s net expenditure in property, plant and 
equipment to total assets. Since this type of investment is characterised by low risk, a 
negative relation between Net PPE and incentive compensation is expected. 
 
5. Results 
5.1. Change in incentive compensation 
 Table 3 presents changes in incentive compensation characteristics from the period 
before SOX to the post-SOX period for our entire sample of acquirers. We document a 
significant (at 1 percent level) drop in the use of executive stock options both in terms of 
mean and median values after the passage of the Act.  While stock options account in average 
for 37.43 percent of top five executives’ compensation before 2002, their average value as a 
percentage of total compensation has fallen to 31.08 percent post-SOX. In contrast, we 
observe a substantial increase in restricted stock with its average (median) value to 
executives’ total compensation rising from 4.29 percent (nil) before SOX to 16.07 percent 
(4.84 percent) post-SOX. As a result, the total value of incentive compensation (measured by 
the sum of new stock and option grants) has increased as a percentage of executives’ total 
compensation but this upturn is due to the increased use of restricted stock. The structure of 
                                                          
12 In accordance with previous studies, this value is set equal to zero when missing from Compustat. 
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managerial compensation has changed significantly post-SOX and we expect this to have an 
important impact on managers’ incentives to undertake risk. This stems from the fact that 
restricted stock is not such an effective mechanism as executive stock options in reducing 
managerial risk-aversion (Smith and Watts, 1982; Guay, 1999).  
 Looking at unexercised (vested and unvested) stock options, we observe a slight 
increase (significant at the 10 percent level) in their average number as a percentage of total 
shares outstanding. This does not contradict the findings of the previous paragraph though. 
Executive stock options take on average around seven years to vest. Thus, the number of 
stock options granted before SOX can affect the Unex_Options variable during our post-SOX 
period. As a confirmation of the way executive incentive compensation have moved towards 
less risky incentives post-SOX, unvested stock (Unvest_Stock) show a significant increase (at 
the 1 percent level) both in terms of mean and median resulting in a subsequent increase in 
the accumulated incentives (Accum_Incentives). The average sensitivity of managers’ wealth 
to bidder’s stock price performance has not changed post-SOX but the sensitivity of their 
wealth to stock price volatility has gone up significantly.  
 
5.2. Change in acquisition risk 
 Table 4 examines the change in standard deviation of acquirer’s stock returns around 
the effective day for our total sample as well as for different levels of incentive 
compensation. Panel A confirms the documented decrease in risk-taking activity post-SOX 
(Bargeron et al., 2010). Before SOX, the completion of an acquisition resulted in an average 
(median) increase in acquirer’s stock return volatility by 12.1 percent (3.4 percent). However, 
post-SOX, the average increase in bidder’s stock return volatility is only 4.9 percent while the 
median volatility drops by 2.8 percent.  
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 Panels B and C examine the change in bidder’s risk under different levels for 
incentive compensation. We partition our sample into High and Low Executive Incentives 
based on the sample median for each compensation variable. The findings are striking. While 
equity-based compensation aligns the interests of managers with those of shareholders before 
SOX by making acquiring managers less risk-averse (Datta et al., 2001), it appears to have 
the opposite impact post-SOX. As Panel B shows, the documented decrease in risk-taking 
activity post-SOX is driven by the high executive incentives group of managers. The results 
are both economically and statistically significant (at the 1 percent level) for all measures of 
incentive compensation. In contrast, the bidders who compensate their managers with more 
flat contracts do not experience a statistically significantly change in the average acquisition 
risk post-SOX. There is some decrease in the median acquisition risk for the latter type of 
bidders but the change is smaller in size and statistical importance than that experienced by 
highly incentivised acquirers.  
We also implement the difference-in-difference approach13 to compare the magnitude 
of change in acquisition risk of High Executive Incentives firms (HEI hereafter) to that of 
their Low Executive Incentives (LEI hereafter) counterparts. The results in Panel C indicate 
that the decrease in acquisition risk post-SOX is significantly higher when an acquisition is 
made by HEI managers compared to acquisition decisions made by LEI directors. The 
average decrease in firm risk following the acquisition is 15.7 percent higher for HEI firms 
when the level of incentives is measured by the value of new restricted stock and options 
grants and 12 percent higher for HEI bidders when Accum_Incentives is used as the 
compensation variable (both differences are significant at the 1 percent level). When we use 
                                                          
13 The reported t-statistics and p-values are those of the coefficient on the interaction between the SOX and the 
compensation variables in the difference-in-difference regressions. Both SOX and Incentive_Compensation are 
dummy variables in the difference-in-difference tests. SOX takes the value of one if the acquisition 
announcement has been made before 30 July 2002 and zero otherwise. Incentive_Compensation takes the value 
of one if the value of the compensation variable used in the regression is above the sample median and zero 
otherwise. 
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Delta and Vega to measure managerial incentives, the decrease in acquisition risk is again 
higher for HEI firms by 11.5 percent and 9.4 percent respectively (both significant at the 5 
percent level). 
Table 5 repeats the analysis of Table 4 using our second proxy for acquisition risk 
which measures the change in volatility of bidder’s abnormal stock returns between the 
period preceding the acquisition announcement and the period following the completion of 
the transaction. Panel A confirms the substantial drop in firm risk following acquisition 
decisions post-SOX. Compared to the pre-SOX period, acquirers experience an average 
(median) 9.5 percent (6.8 percent) lower volatility of abnormal stock returns following an 
acquisition (significant at the 1 percent level). 
Partitioning our sample into HEI and LEI in Panels B and C confirms our previous 
findings that the significant drop in acquisition risk post-SOX stems from the increased risk-
aversion of highly incentivised managers. The decrease in firm risk following acquisitions 
made by HEI bidders is both economically and statistically significant (at the 1 percent level) 
across all four different variables of incentive compensation both in terms of means and 
medians. On the other hand, LEI firms do not experience a statistically significant drop in 
their average acquisition risk under any of the incentive compensation variables used in the 
analysis.  
The difference-in-difference analysis also indicates that the drop in firm risk 
following the acquisition completion is significantly higher for HEI bidders compared to their 
LEI counterparts, with Vega being the only exception. Taking the results of tables 4 and 5 
together, the difference in difference approach shows that in 7 out of 8 cases, highly 
incentivised managers make substantially less risky acquisitions post-SOX than lower 
incentivised directors irrespectively of the variables used to measure incentive compensation 
and acquisition risk.  
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5.3. Multivariate analysis of new incentive grants and acquisition risk 
While Tables 4 and 5 show the magnitude and direction of change in acquirer’s risk 
post-SOX, they do not control for the confounding effects and a number of other important 
factors mentioned earlier in the text. Using multivariate analysis, Table 6 examines the 
impact that new stock and options grants have on the riskiness of acquisitions.14 At this stage 
of the analysis we control for the effect that events such as the collapse in the market value of 
tech stocks, the passage of SFAS No.123R, and the financial crisis can have on changes in 
firm risk, in addition to a number of firm characteristics that prior literature identifies as 
affecting firm risk. We also control for industry fixed effects15 in all our multivariate models. 
The reported t-statistics hereafter are based on robust standard errors. 
The dependent variable in Panel A is our first measure of acquisition risk, that is, the 
change in standard deviation of acquirer’s stock returns over one year surrounding the 
completion of the acquisition. Model 1 provides supportive evidence that, in the pre-SOX 
period, incentive compensation induces managers to make riskier acquisition in line with 
previous research findings (Datta et al., 2001). However, the interaction coefficient of SOX 
and New_Grants is significantly negative, suggesting that high levels of incentive 
compensation make managers less likely to engage in risky acquisition decisions under the 
new regulatory environment. That is, the same agency cost mitigating mechanism 
implemented by firms to induce managers to undertake risky but value-increasing projects 
before 2002, has the opposite impact post-SOX. The results are significant at the 1 percent 
level. Moreover, the size of the interaction coefficient between New_Grants and SOX is more 
than twice the size of the New_Grants coefficient, indicating that new stock and options 
                                                          
14 The number of observations in our multivariate models is lower than the total sample size of 7,747 
acquisitions due to missing data required for the calculation of some of our control variables. 
15 We use the Fama and French (1997) classification of industries. 
19 
 
grants have more than offset the positive impact they previously had on risk-taking activity 
before the passage of SOX. 
We extend this analysis to differentiate between stock options and restricted stock 
grants.  Our descriptive statistics highlight that compensation has switched from options to 
restricted stock grants in the post-SOX period.  Theories of executive compensation highlight 
that a switch away from options would naturally lead to a decline in risk-seeking behaviour 
by firm management.  Models 2 and 3 examine how the riskiness of acquisition is affected by 
new grants of executive stock options and restricted stock respectively. Consistent with the 
arguments of Guay (1999) and Parrino et al. (2005) the coefficient of New_OptionG is 
positively related to post-acquisition changes in firm risk prior to SOX and New_StockG are 
not related to changes in risk.  This reflects the convex payoff function inherent in executive 
stock options, which is not present in restricted stock grants. However, the same instruments 
that reduce managerial risk aversion before 2002 have very different impacts post-SOX. 
After the passage of the Act, managers who are granted a higher value of stock options 
proportional to their total compensation make more conservative decisions relative to their 
counterparts who have more flat contracts. In Model 3, our compensation variable 
(New_StockG) is unable to capture any change in acquisition risk which is all left to be 
explained by the SOX dummy variable.  
The results confirm the robustness of our univariate findings after controlling for a 
series of important confounding events in our sample period. Regarding the rest of the control 
variables, the increase in bidder’s leverage leads to increase in volatility of firm’s stock 
returns, as expected. Larger firms firm appear to increase their risk more than smaller firms 
following the completion of acquisitions is supportive to the findings of the Bargeron et al. 
(2010) that small firms are more likely to experience a decrease in standard deviation of their 
stock returns. Sales growth is also strongly positively related to acquisition risk, according to 
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our expectations, given the documented positive relation between risk-taking activity and 
growth opportunities (Guay, 1999). On the other hand, the time period the CEO has stayed in 
the office before an acquisition announcement is unrelated to the riskiness of the decision 
once we control for the above mentioned parameters.16 
While we investigate the impact that incentive compensation has on the riskiness of 
acquisitions, there may be concerns that these two variables are simultaneously determined. 
That is, while managerial compensation may affect the riskiness of investment decisions, 
firms may in turn determine the structure of executive compensation based on the desired 
level of risk. We address this endogeneity concern in a number of ways. Apart from the 
inclusion of industry fixed effects in all models, our main variables is lagged relative to the 
acquisition announcement. The compensation variables measure the incentives given to 
bidder’s managers at the year preceding the acquisition announcement. In contrast, our proxy 
for acquisition risk measures the change in firm risk surrounding the effective day which 
clearly follows the announcement date. Thus, our incentive compensation measures have 
been defined before any change in risk is observed. Furthermore, we implement the Hausman 
test to examine whether our compensation variables are endogenously determined in our 
regressions. The p-values of the residuals’ coefficient are reported at the end of each model. 
The size of p-values indicates that endogeneity is not an issue here.17 
 Panel B replicates the preceding analysis using our second proxy for acquisition risk 
as the dependent variable. The results remain unchanged and the coefficients of the incentive 
compensation variables remain identical both in terms of size and statistical significance in 
all models. The economically and statistically strong (at the 1 percent level) relation between 
firm risk and incentive compensation before SOX has been reversed after the passage of the 
                                                          
16 We also control for managerial ownership but the results remain identical in all tables. Ownership is 
positively related to risk, as expected, but statistically insignificant. Since the inclusion of ownership as control 
variable results in an important drop in the number of observations to 6,630 due to missing data, we opt not to 
report these results. They are available upon request from the authors. 
17 The results of the Hausman tests are subject to the limitation that the instruments used are truly exogenous. 
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Act. It is also confirmed that the ability of incentive compensation to drive firm risk either 
upwards (pre-SOX) or downwards (post-SOX) stems from the properties of executive stock 
options.  
Regarding the endogeneity issue, the p-value of the Hausman test in model 6 indicates 
that there might be a slight simultaneous determination (significant at the 10 percent level 
only) when examining restricted stock awarded to bidder’s managers and the change in 
acquirer’s standard deviation of abnormal returns. However, since the coefficients of 
New_StockG remain statistically insignificant in all models, this does not actually affect the 
results and implications of our analysis. 
Our results support our core proposition that SOX changes the nature of the risk-
seeking incentives provided by executive compensation.  We find strong evidence that the 
previously documented positive relation between incentive compensation and firm risk no 
longer holds.  Apart from the increased liability of executives post-SOX which has resulted in 
a significant decrease in risk-taking activity, there are a number of other requirements 
included in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act that could possibly explain our results.  
One of these provisions requires that executives return any incentive-based 
compensation awarded to them, along with any profits realised from stock awards in cases of 
subsequent earnings restatements. Given that the higher the volatility of a firm, the higher 
may be the possibility of a future restatement; this could have considerably affected 
managers’ perception of the incentives provided by the structure of their compensation. 
Managers with high proportions of incentive-based compensation have significantly more to 
lose in case of a restatement than managers with higher proportions of cash compensation. 
This can have a direct impact on their decisions to invest in risk-increasing projects. 
 
5.4. Accumulated incentives and changes in post-acquisition risk 
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Taking only new stock and option grants into consideration may not be representative 
of managerial incentives when an investment decision is made. Apart from the year preceding 
the acquisition announcement, directors have been granted stock options and restricted stock 
in previous years too. These accumulated incentives may have an equal or even higher impact 
on managerial decisions given that newly granted incentives cannot be exercised 
immediately. Table 7 examines the impact of all unexercised (vested and unvested) stock 
options and unvested restricted stock on the riskiness of acquisitions. We address any 
concerns of endogeneity following the same methodology as in Section 5.3. 
Panel A uses our first proxy of post-acquisition changes in risk as the dependent 
variable. We control for confounding events and firm characteristics similarly to the previous 
section. The first model shows that the sum of unexercised option grants and unvested stock 
grants has a significant positive association with the riskiness of acquisition before SOX 
confirming our hypothesis that accumulated incentives have an equally strong impact on 
investment decisions as new incentive grants. However, similar to our findings regarding new 
incentive grants, the relation between accumulated incentives and acquisition risk has 
considerably changed after the passage of SOX. After 2002, stock and option grants that have 
not been exercised or vested at the time of acquisition announcement have an economically 
and statistically (at the one percent level) adverse impact on post-acquisition changes in risk.  
Models 2 and 3 isolate the impact of unexercised options and unvested stock 
respectively on acquisition risk. Confirming the findings of earlier studies (Smith and Watts, 
1982; Guay, 1999) as well as our results so far, the regression coefficients show stock option 
can reduce managerial risk-aversion more effectively than restricted stock before SOX. Yet, 
the picture is quite different after the passage of the governance regulation in 2002. Now, 
managers with high proportions of unexercised options appear far more risk averse in their 
investment decisions than managers with lower proportions of accumulated options in their 
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portfolio. Again, the impact of incentive compensation on acquisition risk stems exclusively 
from the properties of executive stock options. In contrast, the coefficients of unvested stock 
remain statistically insignificant and unable to capture any change in acquisition risk. 
Panel B replicates the analysis using our second proxy for acquisition risk. The results 
remain identical in nature although statistically not as strong as before (the coefficients of 
SOX, Financial_Crisis and Sales_Growth remain significant at the one percent level). 
However, the direction of the relations remains the same and consistent with our analysis so 
far. Accumulated incentives have a positive impact on acquisition risk before SOX which is 
due to the convexity of payoffs stemming from executive stock options. Post-SOX though, 
managers with high holdings of unexercised options make less risky acquisitions than their 
lower-incentivised counterparts. Executive stock options seem to have a very different, and 
probably unexpected, impact on managerial risk taking in a governance environment 
associated with increased personal and legal costs. The economically and statistically strong 
negative coefficients of the SOX variable in all our six models confirm the findings of Cohen 
et al. (2007) that the passage of SOX is negatively related to the volatility of future stock 
returns.  
 
5.5. Delta, Vega, and post-acquisition changes in firm risk 
In this section we extend our earlier findings to consider whether changes in the 
sensitivity of managers’ wealth to stock price volatility (Vega) and returns (Delta) are 
associated with changes in firm risk during the post-acquisition period. Given that companies 
may choose to reduce the sensitivity of their directors’ wealth to stock price volatility if their 
target is to lower their risk exposure, it is unclear whether managerial compensation is 
structured by firms in such a way that Vega and Delta are aligned with the desired level of 
risk or if the observed riskiness of acquisition decisions is determined by the sensitivity of 
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managers’ wealth to stock price volatility and performance. Coles et al. (2006) and Cohen et 
al. (2013) show that higher sensitivity of managers’ wealth to stock price volatility (Vega) is 
associated with more risky investments and higher volatility of stock returns. 
Following Rogers (2002), Coles at al. (2006) and Cohen et al. (2013) we run a system 
of three simultaneous regressions where we control for Delta when we examine the effect of 
Vega in acquisition risk and vice versa. We use a three-stage-least-squares (3SLS) model as it 
shows higher consistency and effectiveness than the 2SLS method in large samples (Cohen et 
al., 2013). Acquisition risk, Vega and Delta are the endogenous variables in our 3SLS 
regressions while the rest of the variables are assumed to be exogenously determined for our 
estimation time period.18  
Table 8 presents these results. Panel A uses our first measure of acquisition risk while 
Panel B replicates the analysis using our second proxy for risk. All other model specifications 
between Panels A and B are the same. Both systems of simultaneous equations give identical 
results for our dependent variables, highlighting that the proxies used to measure the riskiness 
of acquisitions are robust. In addition, we control for industry fixed effects in all models. The 
results confirm the findings of the preceding sections. Higher sensitivity of managers’ wealth 
to stock price volatility is positively associated with risk-taking activity before 2002 in line 
with previous research findings (Coles et al., 2006; Cohen et al., 2013). However, we 
document an important shift in this relation after the passage of SOX. Executives whose 
wealth is more closely linked to the volatility of their company’s stock price have become 
more risk-averse post-SOX than those directors with less convexity in their payoffs. As 
documented in the literature, the relation between Delta and Vega remains strong and positive 
which justifies our choice to control for Delta when Vega is used as the dependent variable 
                                                          
18 Similar assumptions have been made elsewhere in the literature (Holthausen et al., 1995; Coles et al., 2006; 
Cohen et al., 2013). 
25 
 
and vice versa since changes in one of these incentive variables can have a considerable 
effect on the other.  
In the second equation of the 3SLS simultaneous equation, Vega is used as the 
dependent variable and it is positively related to acquisition risk, firm size and investment in 
R&D (all coefficients are significant at the 1 percent level in both panels of Table 8).  
Previous studies (Guay, 1999; Coles et al., 2006) also document a positive relation between 
Vega and firm size as well as between Vega and R&D expenditures when Vega is used as the 
dependent variable, providing further support to our findings. Vega is negatively related to 
low-risk investment in property, plant and equipment (Coles et al., 2006) although the 
relation is not statistically significant for our sample. Since higher Vega increases the 
convexity of manager’s payoffs while higher proportions of cash compensation make the 
structure of their payment more flat, a strong negative association between Vega and cash 
compensation should be documented. This is confirmed for our results at the 1 percent level. 
On the other hand, the impact of Delta on firm risk is not so clear (Coles at al., 2006). 
While higher Delta can provide managers with incentives to engage in risky, positive NPV 
projects (John and John, 1993), it also increases the exposure of managers to risk which can 
make them more risk-averse (Guay, 1999). Delta appears to affect negatively the riskiness of 
acquisitions in both periods (pre and post-SOX) but its impact is not economically very 
strong. This is consistent with previous studies (Nam et al., 2003). When Delta is used as the 
dependent variable it appears to be negatively affected by acquisition risk pre-SOX but the 
interaction term between risk and SOX (D_St.Dev.Ab/mal_Ret * SOX) shows a reversal of 
this relation post-SOX. The latter is an additional evidence of the change in managerial 
incentives after 2002. 
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6. Summary and Conclusion 
Empirical evidence is provided of an important decrease in the riskiness of acquisition 
decisions post-SOX.  While the decrease in acquisition risk can be partly explained by 
changes in the structure of executive compensation, we identify for first time in the literature 
a striking change in the way incentive compensation affects managerial decisions post-SOX. 
Increasing the number and value of executive stock options in managers’ portfolio and the 
subsequent sensitivity of their wealth to stock price volatility has been an effective 
mechanism in inducing investment in risky projects before 2002. However, incentive 
compensation not only has failed to offset the adverse impact of SOX on risk-taking activity 
but it leads to a considerably different impact on managerial decisions compared to the pre-
SOX period. Highly-incentivised managers have become more risk averse than their low-
incentivised counterparts which can have a number of explanations.  
Among the many mandates of SOX, directors are required to return any incentive-
based compensation and stock profits in case of earnings restatements. Since the higher the 
exposure of a firm to risk, the higher the probability of a future restatement, managers appear 
to have chosen to minimize firm risk. In addition, those managers with high proportions of 
stock and option grants in their portfolio are likely to incur disproportionally higher costs in 
case of a restatement than directors with more flat compensation contracts. Consequently, it 
will be in their interest to invest in less risky projects post-SOX. 
Alternatively, we may witness an structural change in the way firm risk is perceived 
by managers and shareholders after SOX. Inducing the managers to invest in risky projects 
before SOX was considered to be in the best interests of shareholders as long as these 
projects were also value-increasing. However, this may not necessarily be the case post-SOX.  
After the corporate scandals and the passage of governance regulations in 2002, excessive 
risk-taking may not be in the best interests of shareholders. Since acquisitions are risky 
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investments per se, keeping the associated risk as low as possible could be a closer to optimal 
managerial decision. As noted by Cohen et al. (2013), the increased probability of personal 
costs post-SOX lowers the payoffs from risky projects relative to less risky ones. It remains 
to be confirmed whether low-risk acquisitions can bring more value to shareholders than 
high-risk acquisitions post-SOX. Should this be the case, it would mean that incentive 
compensation can still align the interests of managers with those of shareholders in the post-
SOX period. As this analysis is outside the scope of this paper, it is left for future research.  
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Table 1: Distribution of M&As, Change in Acquisition Risk and Incentive Compensation 
The table presents the distribution of 7,747 acquisitions completed during the period January 1, 1993, to December 31, 2010. Data on executive compensation are 
from ExecuComp and stock price data from CRSP. D_St.Dev.Ef/ve_Date is the change in the standard deviation of acquirer’s stock return between 6 months 
following the effective date (+1 to +126 days) and 6 months preceding the effective date (-126 to -1 days). D_St.Dev.Ab/mal_Ret is the change in the standard 
deviation of acquirer’s abnormal stock return between 60 days following the effective date (+11 to +70) and 60 days preceding the announcement date date (-120 
to -61). New_Grants is the fair value of new stock and options granted to the top five executives as a percentage of their total compensation in the year preceding 
the acquisition announcement. New_OptionG is the fair value of new stock options granted to the top five executives as a percentage of their total compensation 
in the year preceding the acquisition announcement. New_StockG is the fair value of new restricted stock granted to the top five executives as a percentage of 
their total compensation in the year preceding the acquisition announcement. Accum_Incentives is the sum of unexercised stock options and unvested restricted 
stock held by the top five executives as a percentage of the total number of shares outstanding. Delta is the dollar change in top-5 executives’ wealth for a 1 
percent change in the firm’s stock price. Vega is the dollar change in top-5 executives’ wealth for 1 percent change in the standard deviation of the firm’s stock 
return. 
Year 
Number of 
Acquisitions 
% of 
Sample 
Average 
D_St.Dev. 
Ef/ve_Date 
Average 
D_St.Dev. 
Ab/mal_Ret 
Average 
New_Grants 
Average 
New_OptionG 
Average 
New_StockG 
Average 
Accum_Incentives 
Average 
Delta 
($000s) 
Average 
Vega 
($000s) 
 
                    
1993 319 4.1% -0.09 -0.14 0.227 0.190 0.037 0.016 693 93 
1994 347 4.5% -0.10 -0.14 0.301 0.269 0.032 0.019 630 136 
1995 342 4.4% 0.11 0.12 0.335 0.295 0.040 0.027 1,215 144 
1996 459 5.9% 0.04 0.05 0.316 0.276 0.041 0.023 2,576 175 
1997 528 6.8% 0.09 0.10 0.390 0.343 0.047 0.026 1,848 233 
1998 569 7.3% 0.42 0.69 0.451 0.410 0.042 0.028 3,990 329 
1999 582 7.5% 0.29 0.23 0.474 0.425 0.049 0.026 6,261 443 
2000 525 6.8% 0.16 0.23 0.533 0.489 0.044 0.027 8,332 799 
2001 426 5.5% -0.33 -0.49 0.537 0.488 0.049 0.029 2,351 608 
2002 446 5.8% 0.02 -0.04 0.520 0.476 0.044 0.034 3,005 546 
2003 456 5.9% -0.29 -0.37 0.480 0.406 0.074 0.031 3,976 684 
2004 476 6.1% -0.04 -0.05 0.475 0.386 0.089 0.034 3,215 740 
2005 472 6.1% -0.01 0.04 0.494 0.377 0.118 0.029 3,360 906 
2006 436 5.6% -0.04 -0.08 0.444 0.296 0.148 0.025 4,693 678 
2007 463 6.0% 0.57 0.50 0.454 0.254 0.200 0.026 4,800 649 
2008 356 4.6% 1.33 1.09 0.445 0.171 0.274 0.023 1,200 454 
2009 261 3.4% -0.85 -0.97 0.490 0.201 0.288 0.026 1,375 621 
2010 284 3.7% -0.17 0.00 0.466 0.204 0.262 0.020 1,865 573 
           Τotal 7,747 100.0% 0.09 0.08 0.441 0.347 0.094 0.027 3,376 497 
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Table 2: Summary Statistics 
The table presents summary statistics for the sample of 7,747 acquisitions completed during the period January 1, 
1993, to December 31, 2010. Data on executive compensation are from ExecuComp, stock price data from CRSP and 
accounting data from Compustat. D_St.Dev.Ef/ve_Date is the change in the standard deviation of acquirer’s stock 
return between 6 months following the effective date (+1 to +126 days) and 6 months preceding the effective date (-
126 to -1 days). D_St.Dev.Ab/mal_Ret is the change in the standard deviation of acquirer’s abnormal stock return 
between 60 days following the effective date (+11 to +70) and 60 days preceding the announcement date date (-120 to 
-61). Cash_Comp is the sum of salary and bonus paid to top five executives as a percentage of their total 
compensation in the year preceding the acquisition announcement. New_OptionG is the fair value of new stock 
options granted to the top five executives as a percentage of their total compensation in the year preceding the 
acquisition announcement. New_StockG is the fair value of new restricted stock granted to the top five executives as a 
percentage of their total compensation in the year preceding the acquisition announcement. New_Grants is the fair 
value of new stock and options granted to the top five executives as a percentage of their total compensation in the 
year preceding the acquisition announcement. Unex_Options is the number of unexercised stock options held by the 
top five executives as a percentage of the total number of shares outstanding. Unvest_Stock is the number of unvested 
restricted stock grants to the top five executives as a percentage of the total number of shares outstanding. 
Accum_Incentives is the sum of unexercised stock options and unvested restricted stock held by the top five 
executives as a percentage of the total number of shares outstanding. Delta is the dollar change in top-5 executives’ 
wealth for a 1 percent change in the firm’s stock price. Vega is the dollar change in top-5 executives’ wealth for 1 
percent change in the standard deviation of the firm’s stock returns. D_Leverage is the change in the ratio of total debt 
to total assets. log(Sales) is the logarithm of sales. Sales_Growth is the logarithm of the percentage change in sales. 
ROA is the acquirer’s operating income before depreciation divided by total assets. Tenure is the number of months 
the CEO has been in the office at the time of the acquisition announcement. Cash is the cash and cash equivalent 
available to the acquirer divided by total assets. R&D is the acquirer’s research and development expenditures to total 
assets. Net_PPE is the acquirer’s net expenditure in property, plant and equipment to total assets. M/B is the market-
to-book ratio of the acquirer at the month-end prior to the acquisition announcement. 
 
Variable Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
25th 
Percentile 
Median 
75th 
Percentile 
Number of 
Observations 
 
  
     
Risk Measures   
     D_St.Dev.Ef/ve_Date 0.089 0.988 -0.389 0.006 0.458 7,747 
D_St.Dev.Ab/mal_Ret 0.077 1.106 -0.434 0.004 0.499 7,747 
 
  
     
Compensation Variables   
     Cash_Comp 0.463 0.258 0.254 0.428 0.648 7,747 
New_OptionG 0.347 0.274 0.113 0.307 0.559 7,747 
New_StockG 0.094 0.170 0.000 0.000 0.138 7,747 
New_Grants 0.441 0.267 0.233 0.454 0.646 7,747 
Unex_Options 0.025 0.030 0.007 0.017 0.034 7,740 
Unvest_Stock 0.001 0.005 0.000 0.000 0.001 7,741 
Accum_Incentives 0.027 0.031 0.008 0.018 0.036 7,740 
Delta 3,376 27,499 263 680 1,947 7,406 
Vega 497 1,046 63 163 479 7,406 
 
  
     
Firm Characteristics   
     D_Leverage 0.015 0.091 -0.021 0.000 0.039 7,701 
log(Sales) 3.146 0.704 2.646 3.079 3.603 7,706 
Sales_Growth 0.069 0.122 0.010 0.050 0.109 7,701 
ROA 0.126 0.095 0.060 0.125 0.182 7,705 
Tenure 100 126 32 68 126 7,148 
Cash 0.138 0.163 0.023 0.065 0.202 7,672 
R&D 0.035 0.063 0.000 0.000 0.050 7,747 
Net_PPE 0.206 0.219 0.045 0.133 0.284 7,672 
M/B 2.20 2.11 1.18 1.58 2.34 7,486 
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Table 3: Change in Incentive Compensation 
The table presents changes in incentive compensation of the top five executives of the acquiring firms 
included in the sample of 7,747 acquisitions completed during the period January 1, 1993, to December 31, 
2010. Data on executive compensation are from ExecuComp. Acquisitions with an announcement date after 
30 July 2002 belong to the Post-SOX period, otherwise they belong to the pre-SOX period. New_OptionG is 
the fair value of new stock options granted to the top five executives as a percentage of their total 
compensation in the year preceding the acquisition announcement. New_StockG is the fair value of new 
restricted stock granted to the top five executives as a percentage of their total compensation in the year 
preceding the acquisition announcement. New_Grants is the fair value of new stock and options granted to 
the top five executives as a percentage of their total compensation in the year preceding the acquisition 
announcement. Unex_Options is the number of unexercised stock options held by the top five executives as a 
percentage of the total number of shares outstanding. Unvest_Stock is the number of unvested restricted stock 
grants to the top five executives as a percentage of the total number of shares outstanding. Accum_Incentives 
is the sum of unexercised stock options and unvested restricted stock held by the top five executives as a 
percentage of the total number of shares outstanding. Delta is the dollar change in top-5 executives’ wealth 
for a 1 percent change in the firm’s stock price. Vega is the dollar change in top-5 executives’ wealth for 1 
percent change in the standard deviation of the firm’s stock returns. t-statistics are from the t-test of 
difference between means and z-statistics are from the Wilcoxon rank sum test for difference between the 
respective distributions. 
 
 
Variable Pre SOX Post SOX 
Difference 
Post vs Pre 
t/z  
Statistics 
p-value 
New_OptionG 
     mean 0.3743 0.3108 -0.0635 -10.18 0.000 
median 0.3389 0.2721 -0.0668 -9.62 0.000 
New_StockG 
     mean 0.0429 0.1607 0.1178 32.27 0.000 
median 0.0000 0.0484 0.0484 30.75 0.000 
New_Grants 
     mean 0.4172 0.4715 0.0542 8.93 0.000 
median 0.4080 0.4974 0.0894 9.16 0.000 
Unex_Options 
     mean 0.0247 0.0260 0.0013 1.82 0.068 
median 0.0153 0.0191 0.0038 5.21 0.000 
Unvest_Stock 
     mean 0.0008 0.0019 0.0011 10.83 0.000 
median 0.0000 0.0002 0.0002 21.67 0.000 
Accum_Incentives 
     mean 0.0256 0.0279 0.0024 3.39 0.001 
median 0.0163 0.0207 0.0044 7.24 0.000 
Delta 
     mean 3365 3390 25 0.038 0.970 
median 603 800 197 7.33 0.000 
Vega 
     mean 362 676 314 12.92 0.000 
median 121 251 131 18.47 0.000 
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Table 4: Change in Standard Deviation of Acquirer's Stock Returns around the Effective Date 
The table presents changes in the standard deviation of stock returns of the acquiring firms included in the sample 
of 7,747 acquisitions completed during the period January 1, 1993, to December 31, 2010. Data on executive 
compensation are from ExecuComp and stock price data from CRSP. The standard deviation of acquirer’s stock 
return is estimated between 6 months following the effective date (+1 to +126 days) and 6 months preceding the 
effective date (-126 to -1 days). Acquisitions with an announcement date after 30 July 2002 belong to the Post-SOX 
period, otherwise they belong to the pre-SOX period. The sample is partitioned into High and Low Executive 
Incentives based on the sample median for each compensation variable. New_Grants is the fair value of new stock 
and options granted to the top five executives as a percentage of their total compensation in the year preceding the 
acquisition announcement. Accum_Incentives is the sum of unexercised stock options and unvested restricted stock 
held by the top five executives as a percentage of the total number of shares outstanding. Delta is the dollar change 
in top-5 executives’ wealth for a 1 percent change in the firm’s stock price. Vega is the dollar change in top-5 
executives’ wealth for 1 percent change in the standard deviation of the firm’s stock returns. t-statistics are from the 
t-test of difference between means and z-statistics are from the Wilcoxon rank sum test for difference between the 
respective distributions. In the difference-in-difference regressions the reported t-statistics and p-values are those of 
the coefficient on the interaction between the SOX and the Compensation variables. SOX is a dummy variable that 
takes the value of 1 if the acquisition announcement is made after 30 July 2002 and 0 otherwise. 
 
Panel A: Total Sample 
 
Pre SOX Post SOX 
Difference 
Post vs Pre 
t/z  
Statistics 
p-value 
mean 0.121 0.049 -0.073 -3.17 0.002 
median 0.034 -0.028 -0.061 -4.81 0.000 
observations 4360 3387 
   
      Panel B: High Executive Incentives 
Compensation 
Variable 
Pre SOX Post SOX 
Difference 
Post vs Pre 
t/z  
Statistics 
p-value 
New_Grants 
     mean 0.177 0.024 -0.153 -4.30 0.000 
median 0.046 -0.049 -0.095 -4.88 0.000 
observations 1948 1925 
   
Accum_ Incentives 
     mean 0.148 0.017 -0.131 -3.96 0.000 
median 0.034 -0.041 -0.074 -3.81 0.000 
observations 2010 1871 
   
Delta 
     mean 0.114 -0.012 -0.126 -4.36 0.000 
median 0.047 -0.044 -0.091 -4.41 0.000 
observations 1986 1717 
   
Vega 0.111 0.003 -0.108 -3.58 0.000 
mean 0.032 -0.049 -0.081 -4.00 0.000 
median 1770 1933 
   
      (The table is continued on the next page.) 
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Table 4 (Continued) 
Panel C: Low Executive Incentives 
Compensation 
Variable 
Pre SOX Post SOX 
Difference 
Post vs Pre 
t/z  
Statistics 
p-value 
New_Grants 
     mean 0.076 0.080 0.004 0.15 0.881 
median 0.030 -0.001 -0.031 -1.39 0.166 
observations 2412 1462 
   Difference In Difference (High VS Low Incentives) -0.157 -3.45 0.000 
      Accum_Incentives 
     mean 0.098 0.087 -0.011 -0.32 0.751 
median 0.035 -0.006 -0.041 -2.74 0.006 
observations 2350 1516 
   Difference In Difference (High VS Low Incentives) -0.120 -2.65 0.008 
      Delta 
     mean 0.120 0.109 -0.011 -0.29 0.775 
median 0.028 -0.003 -0.031 -2.23 0.026 
observations 2247 1456 
   Difference In Difference (High VS Low Incentives) -0.115 -2.50 0.012 
      Vega 
     mean 0.122 0.107 -0.014 -0.36 0.718 
median 0.038 0.016 -0.022 -1.81 0.070 
observations 2463 1240 
   Difference In Difference (High VS Low Incentives) -0.094 -2.01 0.045 
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Table 5: Change in Standard Deviation of Acquirer's Abnormal Stock Returns 
The table presents changes in the standard deviation of abnormal stock returns of the acquiring firms included the 
sample of 7,747 acquisitions completed during the period January 1, 1993, to December 31, 2010. Data on 
executive compensation are from ExecuComp and stock price data from CRSP. The standard deviation of 
acquirer’s abnormal stock return is estimated between 60 days following the effective date (+11 to +70) and 60 
days preceding the announcement date date (-120 to -61). Acquisitions with an announcement date after 30 July 
2002 belong to the Post-SOX period, otherwise they belong to the pre-SOX period. The sample is partitioned into 
High and Low Executive Incentives based on the sample median for each compensation variable. New_Grants is the 
fair value of new stock and options granted to the top five executives as a percentage of their total compensation in 
the year preceding the acquisition announcement. Accum_Incentives is the sum of unexercised stock options and 
unvested restricted stock held by the top five executives as a percentage of the total number of shares outstanding. 
Delta is the dollar change in top-5 executives’ wealth for a 1 percent change in the firm’s stock price. Vega is the 
dollar change in top-5 executives’ wealth for 1 percent change in the standard deviation of the firm’s stock returns. 
t-statistics are from the t-test of difference between means and z-statistics are from the Wilcoxon rank sum test for 
difference between the respective distributions. In the difference-in-difference regressions the reported t-statistics 
and p-values are those of the coefficient on the interaction between the SOX and the Compensation variables. SOX 
is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the acquisition announcement is made after 30 July 2002 and 0 
otherwise. 
 
Panel A: Total Sample 
  Pre SOX Post SOX 
Difference 
Post vs Pre 
t/z  
Statistics 
p-value 
mean 0.118 0.024 -0.095 -3.79 0.000 
median 0.042 -0.026 -0.068 -4.39 0.000 
observations 4360 3387 
   
      Panel B: High Executive Incentives 
Compensation 
Variable 
Pre SOX Post SOX 
Difference 
Post vs Pre 
t/z  
Statistics 
p-value 
New_Grants 
     mean 0.163 -0.013 -0.176 -4.50 0.000 
median 0.101 -0.044 -0.144 -5.03 0.000 
observations 1948 1925 
   
Accum_Incentives 
     mean 0.146 -0.014 -0.160 -4.24 0.000 
median 0.058 -0.047 -0.104 -3.76 0.000 
observations 2010 1871 
   
Delta 
     mean 0.116 -0.020 -0.136 -4.04 0.000 
median 0.080 -0.039 -0.119 -4.51 0.000 
observations 1986 1717 
   
Vega 0.088 -0.022 -0.110 -3.22 0.001 
mean 0.050 -0.047 -0.096 -3.51 0.000 
median 1770 1933 
   
      (The table is continued on the next page.) 
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Table 5 (Continued) 
Panel C: Low Executive Incentives 
Compensation 
Variable 
Pre SOX Post SOX 
Difference 
Post vs Pre 
t/z  
Statistics 
p-value 
New_Grants 
     mean 0.082 0.072 -0.010 -0.31 0.754 
median 0.006 -0.005 -0.011 -0.80 0.425 
observations 2412 1462 
   Difference In Difference (High VS Low Incentives) -0.166 -3.25 0.001 
      Accum_Incentives 
     mean 0.095 0.070 -0.025 -0.71 0.478 
median 0.032 -0.011 -0.043 -2.26 0.024 
observations 2350 1516 
   Difference In Difference (High VS Low Incentives) -0.135 -2.66 0.008 
      Delta 
     mean 0.114 0.068 -0.046 -1.17 0.241 
median 0.006 -0.017 -0.023 -1.89 0.059 
observations 2247 1456 
   Difference In Difference (High VS Low Incentives) -0.090 -1.73 0.083 
      Vega 
     mean 0.134 0.087 -0.047 -1.14 0.252 
median 0.040 0.007 -0.033 -2.00 0.045 
observations 2463 1240 
   Difference In Difference (High VS Low Incentives) -0.063 -1.19 0.232 
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Table 6: Multivariate Analysis of Change in Acquisition Risk under New Incentive Grants 
The table presents multivariate analysis of the change in risk of acquiring firms included the sample of 7,747 acquisitions completed during the period January 1, 
1993, to December 31, 2010. Data on executive compensation are from ExecuComp, stock price data from CRSP and accounting data from Compustat. 
D_St.Dev.Ef/ve_Date is the change in the standard deviation of acquirer’s stock return between 6 months following the effective date (+1 to +126 days) and 6 
months preceding the effective date (-126 to -1 days). D_St.Dev.Ab/mal_Ret is the change in the standard deviation of acquirer’s abnormal stock return between 60 
days following the effective date (+11 to +70) and 60 days preceding the announcement date date (-120 to -61). New_OptionG is the fair value of new stock options 
granted to the top five executives as a percentage of their total compensation in the year preceding the acquisition announcement. New_StockG is the fair value of 
new restricted stock granted to the top five executives as a percentage of their total compensation in the year preceding the acquisition announcement. New_Grants is 
the fair value of new stock and options granted to the top five executives as a percentage of their total compensation in the year preceding the acquisition 
announcement. SOX is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the acquisition announcement is made after 30 July 2002 and 0 otherwise. Internet_Crash is the 
decile rankings of acquirers with an acquisition announcement date within the years 2000 and 2001 based on their cumulative stock returns. SFAS_123R is a dummy 
variable that takes the value of 1 if the acquisition announcement is made in 2006 and 0 otherwise. Financial_Crisis is the decile rankings of acquirers with an 
acquisition announcement date within the years 2007-2009 based on their cumulative stock returns. log(Sales) is the logarithm of sales. D_Leverage is the change in 
the ratio of total debt to total assets. Sales_Growth is the logarithm of the percentage change in sales. Tenure is the number of months the CEO has been in the office 
at the time of the acquisition announcement. t-statistics based on robust standard errors are in parenthesis. ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 
5% and 10% levels respectively.  
  Panel A Panel B 
Variable 
D_St.Dev.  
Ef/ve_Date  
Model 1 
D_St.Dev.  
Ef/ve_Date  
Model 2 
D_St.Dev.  
Ef/ve_Date  
Model 3 
D_St.Dev.  
Ab/mal_Ret  
Model 4 
D_St.Dev.  
Ab/mal_Ret  
Model 5 
D_St.Dev.  
Ab/mal_Ret  
Model 6 
Constant -0.0040 0.0250 0.0993 0.0189 0.0393 0.1270 
 
(-0.02) (0.14) (0.57) (0.13) (0.26) (0.86) 
New_Grants 0.2014*** 
  
0.2171*** 
  
 
(3.04) 
  
(2.73) 
  New_Grants * SOX -0.4495*** 
  
-0.4282*** 
  
 
(-4.77) 
  
(-4.04) 
  New_OptionG   0.1900*** 
 
  0.2118*** 
 
 
  (2.85) 
 
  (2.66) 
 New_OptionG * SOX   -0.3836*** 
 
  -0.4143*** 
 
 
  (-4.36) 
 
  (-4.16) 
 New_StockG   
 
0.0838   
 
0.0291 
 
  
 
(0.67)   
 
(0.19) 
New_StockG * SOX   
 
-0.1367   
 
-0.0121 
 
  
 
(-0.85)   
 
(-0.07) 
SOX -0.0672 -0.1280*** -0.2548*** -0.0343 -0.0733* -0.2214*** 
 
(-1.43) (-3.42) (-8.99) (-0.66) (-1.73) (-6.87) 
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Table 6 (Continued) 
  Panel A Panel B 
Variable 
D_St.Dev.  
Ef/ve_Date  
Model 1 
D_St.Dev.  
Ef/ve_Date  
Model 2 
D_St.Dev.  
Ef/ve_Date  
Model 3 
D_St.Dev.  
Ab/mal_Ret  
Model 4 
D_St.Dev.  
Ab/mal_Ret  
Model 5 
D_St.Dev.  
Ab/mal_Ret  
Model 6 
Internet_Crash -0.0168** -0.0163* -0.0110 -0.0214** -0.0212** -0.0153 
 
(-2.02) (-1.96) (-1.37) (-2.18) (-2.16) (-1.62) 
SFAS_123R 0.0853** 0.0837** 0.0971*** 0.0093 0.0056 0.0183 
 
(2.43) (2.37) (2.76) (0.24) (0.15) (0.48) 
Financial_Crisis 0.1065*** 0.1030*** 0.1081*** 0.0762*** 0.0724*** 0.0764*** 
 
(10.90) (10.40) (11.01) (8.40) (7.89) (8.34) 
log(Sales) 0.0393** 0.0361* 0.0344* 0.0414* 0.0399* 0.0376* 
 
(2.14) (1.96) (1.87) (1.92) (1.84) (1.73) 
D_Leverage 0.3639** 0.3605** 0.3477** 0.1603 0.1590 0.1449 
 
(2.52) (2.50) (2.41) (1.02) (1.02) (0.93) 
Sales_Growth 0.6067*** 0.6019*** 0.6224*** 0.6762*** 0.6713*** 0.6934*** 
 
(4.72) (4.68) (4.84) (4.84) (4.81) (4.97) 
Tenure -0.0036 -0.0034 -0.0056 0.0013 0.0015 -0.0009 
 
(-0.42) (-0.39) (-0.64) (0.15) (0.17) (-0.10) 
 
  
  
  
  Number of Observations 7,142 7,142 7,142 7,142 7,142 7,142 
F-Statistic 8.45 8.06 5.99 64.71 72.85 4.01 
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Hausman p-value 0.838 0.295 0.439 0.137 0.560 0.071 
R-Squared 0.065 0.065 0.062 0.035 0.035 0.033 
Industry Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES 
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Table 7: Multivariate Analysis of Change in Acquisition Risk under Accumulated Incentives 
The table presents multivariate analysis of the change in risk of acquiring firms included the sample of 7,747 acquisitions completed during the period January 1, 1993, to 
December 31, 2010. Data on executive compensation are from ExecuComp, stock price data from CRSP and accounting data from Compustat. D_St.Dev.Ef/ve_Date is the 
change in the standard deviation of acquirer’s stock return between 6 months following the effective date (+1 to +126 days) and 6 months preceding the effective date (-126 
to -1 days). D_St.Dev.Ab/mal_Ret is the change in the standard deviation of acquirer’s abnormal stock return between 60 days following the effective date (+11 to +70) and 
60 days preceding the announcement date date (-120 to -61). Unex_Options is the number of unexercised stock options held by the top five executives as a percentage of 
the total number of shares outstanding. Unvest_Stock is the number of unvested restricted stock grants to the top five executives as a percentage of the total number of 
shares outstanding. Accum_Incentives is the sum of unexercised stock options and unvested restricted stock held by the top five executives as a percentage of the total 
number of shares outstanding. SOX is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the acquisition announcement is made after 30 July 2002 and 0 otherwise. 
Internet_Crash is the decile rankings of acquirers with an acquisition announcement date within the years 2000 and 2001 based on their cumulative stock returns. 
SFAS_123R is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the acquisition announcement is made in 2006 and 0 otherwise. Financial_Crisis is the decile rankings of 
acquirers with an acquisition announcement date within the years 2007-2009 based on their cumulative stock returns. log(Sales) is the logarithm of sales. D_Leverage is the 
change in the ratio of total debt to total assets. Sales_Growth is the logarithm of the percentage change in sales. Tenure is the number of months the CEO has been in the 
office at the time of the acquisition announcement. t-statistics based on robust standard errors are in parenthesis. ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% 
and 10% levels respectively. 
  Panel A Panel B 
Variable 
D_St.Dev.  
Ef/ve_Date  
Model 1 
D_St.Dev.  
Ef/ve_Date  
Model 2 
D_St.Dev.  
Ef/ve_Date  
Model 3 
D_St.Dev.  
Ab/mal_Ret  
Model 4 
D_St.Dev.  
Ab/mal_Ret  
Model 5 
D_St.Dev.  
Ab/mal_Ret  
Model 6 
Constant -0.0007 -0.0066 0.1174 0.0760 0.0687 0.1418 
 
(-0.00) (-0.04) (0.67) (0.50) (0.45) (0.96) 
Accum_Incentives 2.5650*** 
  
1.3580* 
  
 
(3.80) 
  
(1.78) 
  Accum_Incentives * SOX -3.1820*** 
  
-1.882** 
  
 
(-3.83) 
  
(-1.98) 
  Unex_Options   2.6390*** 
 
  1.4590* 
 
 
  (3.92) 
 
  (1.90) 
 Unex_Options * SOX   -3.0260*** 
 
  -1.8004* 
 
 
  (-3.58) 
 
  (-1.86) 
 Unvest_Stock   
 
0.2623   
 
-4.067 
 
  
 
(0.04)   
 
(-0.51) 
Unvest_Stock * SOX   
 
-6.5420   
 
-0.7677 
 
  
 
(-0.91)   
 
(-0.09) 
SOX -0.1815*** -0.1896*** -0.2535*** -0.1708*** -0.1758*** -0.2159*** 
 
(-5.63) (-5.96) (-9.92) (-4.69) (-4.87) (-7.28) 
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Table 7 (Continued) 
 
Panel A Panel B 
Variable 
D_St.Dev.  
Ef/ve_Date  
Model 1 
D_St.Dev.  
Ef/ve_Date  
Model 2 
D_St.Dev.  
Ef/ve_Date  
Model 3 
D_St.Dev.  
Ab/mal_Ret  
Model 4 
D_St.Dev.  
Ab/mal_Ret  
Model 5 
D_St.Dev.  
Ab/mal_Ret  
Model 6 
Internet_Crash -0.0118 -0.0119 -0.0108 -0.0156* -0.0157* -0.0152 
 
(-1.47) (-1.49) (-1.35) (-1.65) (-1.67) (-1.62) 
SFAS_123R 0.0903** 0.0910*** 0.0962*** 0.0148 0.0153 0.0188 
 
(2.58) (2.60) (2.74) (0.39) (0.40) (0.49) 
Financial_Crisis 0.1061*** 0.1061*** 0.1079*** 0.0760*** 0.0760*** 0.0773*** 
 
(10.80) (10.90) (11.01) (8.41) (8.42) (8.52) 
log(Sales) 0.0451** 0.0474** 0.0310* 0.0422* 0.0442* 0.0352 
 
(2.30) (2.41) (1.68) (1.80) (1.89) (1.61) 
D_Leverage 0.3951*** 0.3937*** 0.3579** 0.1733 0.1732 0.1529 
 
(2.75) (2.74) (2.47) (1.11) (1.11) (0.98) 
Sales_Growth 0.5743*** 0.5723*** 0.6263*** 0.6731*** 0.6706*** 0.7020*** 
 
(4.54) (4.53) (4.88) (4.84) (4.82) (5.04) 
Tenure -0.0058 -0.0060 -0.0058 -0.0008 -0.0010 -0.0012 
 
(-0.66) (-0.69) (-0.66) (-0.10) (-0.12) (-0.14) 
 
  
  
  
  N 7,139 7,139 7,140 7,139 7,139 7,140 
F-Statistic 5.68 5.70 5.62 3.65 3.66 3.67 
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Hausman p-value 0.927 0.891 0.246 0.140 0.156 0.038 
R-Squared 0.066 0.66 0.063 0.034 0.034 0.033 
Industry Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES 
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Table 8: 3SLS estimations for Change in Acquisition Risk, Vega and Delta 
The table presents simultaneous regressions of Acquisition Risk, Vega and Delta. The sample consists of 7,747 acquisitions completed during the period January 1, 1993, to 
December 31, 2010. Data on executive compensation are from ExecuComp, stock price data from CRSP and accounting data from Compustat. D_St.Dev.Ef/ve_Date is the 
change in the standard deviation of acquirer’s stock return between 6 months following the effective date (+1 to +126 days) and 6 months preceding the effective date (-126 
to -1 days). D_St.Dev.Ab/mal_Ret is the change in the standard deviation of acquirer’s abnormal stock return between 60 days following the effective date (+11 to +70) and 
60 days preceding the announcement date date (-120 to -61). Delta is the dollar change in top-5 executives’ wealth for a 1 percent change in the firm’s stock price. Vega is 
the dollar change in top-5 executives’ wealth for 1 percent change in the standard deviation of the firm’s stock returns. Cash_Comp is the sum of salary and bonus paid to 
top five executives as a percentage of their total compensation in the year preceding the acquisition announcement. SOX is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the 
acquisition announcement is made after 30 July 2002 and 0 otherwise. Internet_Crash is the decile rankings of acquirers with an acquisition announcement date within the 
years 2000 and 2001 based on their cumulative stock returns. SFAS_123R is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the acquisition announcement is made in 2006 
and 0 otherwise. Financial_Crisis is the decile rankings of acquirers with an acquisition announcement date within the years 2007-2009 based on their cumulative stock 
returns. log(Sales) is the logarithm of sales. D_Leverage is the change in the ratio of total debt to total assets. Sales_Growth is the logarithm of the percentage change in 
sales. Tenure is the number of months the CEO has been in the office at the time of the acquisition announcement. M/B is the market-to-book ratio of the acquirer at the 
month-end prior to the acquisition announcement. ROA is the acquirer’s operating income before depreciation divided by total assets. R&D is the acquirer’s research and 
development expenditures to total assets. Net_PPE is the acquirer’s net expenditure in property, plant and equipment to total assets. Cash is the cash and cash equivalent 
available to the acquirer divided by total assets. t-statistics based on robust standard errors are in parenthesis. ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% 
and 10% levels respectively. 
 
Panel A Panel B 
Variable 
D_St.Dev.  
Ef/ve_Date 
Vega Delta D_St.Dev.  Vega Delta 
Ab/mal_Ret 
D_St.Dev.Ef/ve_Date   0.3272*** -34.4999***   
  
 
  (2.98) (-4.04)   
  D_St.Dev.Ef/ve_Date * SOX   0.0159 21.1373**   
  
 
  (0.14) (2.48)   
  D_St.Dev.Ab/mal_Ret   
  
  0.5413*** -41.9691*** 
 
  
  
  (4.92) (-3.92) 
D_St.Dev.Ab/mal_Ret * SOX   
  
  -0.1401 19.7421* 
 
  
  
  (-1.26) (1.84) 
Vega 0.7545*** 
 
19.9678*** 0.7862*** 
 
25.6127*** 
 
(7.69) 
 
(34.82) (7.59) 
 
(37.00) 
Vega * SOX -0.2701*** 
  
-0.1674* 
  
 
(-3.02) 
  
(-1.78) 
  Delta  -0.0063* 0.0227*** 
 
-0.0093** 0.0214*** 
 
 
(-1.67) (32.44) 
 
(-2.35) (30.45) 
 Delta * SOX -0.0086** 
  
-0.0093** 
  
 
(-2.28) 
  
(-2.37) 
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Table 8 (Continued)  
SOX -0.3346*** 0.4347*** -13.4213*** -0.3844*** 0.4619*** -17.0482*** 
 
(-9.16) (13.38) (-9.69) (-9.53) (13.82) (-9.77) 
Internet_Crash -0.0741*** 0.0625*** -2.1248*** -0.0810*** 0.0718*** -2.9078*** 
 
(-7.44) (9.88) (-6.76) (-7.49) (10.45) (-6.42) 
SFAS_123R 0.1699*** -0.1896*** 4.2364** 0.1150* -0.1641*** 4.2417* 
 
(3.05) (-3.69) (2.29) (1.84) (-3.06) (1.82) 
Financial_Crisis 0.1231*** -0.0688*** 1.7646*** 0.0945*** -0.0625*** 2.2492*** 
 
(19.92) (-11.53) (8.27) (13.66) (-10.30) (8.59) 
log(Sales) -0.2873*** 0.5035*** -6.4957*** -0.3395*** 0.5096*** -10.3584*** 
 
(-9.57) (27.1) (-8.64) (-10.41) (26.50) (-11.20) 
D_Leverage 0.3398** -0.0595 7.0971 0.1805 -0.0147 4.5873 
 
(2.50) (-0.47) (1.56) (1.19) (-0.11) (0.80) 
Sales_Growth 0.4712*** 
  
0.3299*** 
  
 
(4.66) 
  
(3.07) 
  Tenure 0.0014 
 
0.7267** 0.0093 
 
0.7450** 
 
(0.15) 
 
(2.58) (0.63) 
 
(2.17) 
M/B   
 
2.1445***   
 
1.9006*** 
 
  
 
(4.73)   
 
(3.50) 
ROA   -0.1304 
 
  -0.0646 
 
 
  (-1.00) 
 
  (-0.51) 
 R&D   0.8788*** -9.6128   0.6675*** 0.8008 
 
  (3.96) (-0.99)   (2.84) (0.06) 
Net_PPE   -0.0899 -5.3046   -0.0777 -3.0965 
 
  (-1.00) (-1.40)   (-0.89) (-0.81) 
Cash    
 
1.74120   
 
-0.1332 
 
  
 
(0.41)   
 
(-0.02) 
Cash_Comp   -0.3621*** 
 
  -0.3315*** 
 
 
  (-7.60) 
 
  (-6.87) 
 
 
  
  
  
  N 6,701  6,701 6,701 6,701  6,701 6,701 
Industry Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES 
 
